DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 266 495 CS 505 073

AUTHOR Stevenson, Robert L.
TITLE New Actors, New Institutions in World Communications.
PUB DATE May 85
NOTE 25p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Communication Association (35th, Honolulu, HI, May 23-27, 1985).
PUB TYPE Viewpoints (120) -- Speeches/Conference Papers (150)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Communications; *Developing Nations; *Economic Development; Global Approach; Journalism; Mass Media; *Telecommunications
IDENTIFIERS *New World Information Order

ABSTRACT

The Unesco-New World Information Order debate regarding the problems of communication development faced by the Third World is the focus of this paper. The paper begins with a discussion of the reasons for the United States withdrawal from Unesco, mentioning its lack of faith in the purposes, competence, and honesty of the organization. The second part of the paper discusses reasons for the failure of the New World Information Order, while the third part points out the importance of communication development to economic development and cites three studies focusing on telecommunications--the centerpiece of a renewed interest in communication and development for the rest of the 1980s and into the 1990s. The fourth part of the paper discusses (1) four U.S. government agencies investing in communication development in third world countries in 1984; (2) the government and media interest in the issue; (3) a list of 300 exchange, training, and internship programs in 70 countries put together by the World Press Freedom Committee and the Associated Press; (4) the establishment of a permanent foreign journalists' center (with a list of the orientation and training programs for which it serves as a clearinghouse); and (5) evidence of commitment to long-term development assistance. The paper concludes that communication has the potential to contribute constructively to Third World Development. (EL)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

☒ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official NIE position or policy.

ED266495

New Actors, New Institutions in World Communications

Robert L. Stevenson

School of Journalism
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill NC 27514

(919) 962-1204

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Robert L. Stevenson

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

Presented to the International Communication Association, meeting in Honolulu Hawaii, May, 1985.

CS 505073

New Actors, New Institutions in World Communications

From any perspective, the U.S. withdrawal from Unesco at the end of 1984 was a turning point in the long, twisted history of the New World Information Order debate. With the American departure, Britain and Singapore in the exit queue and a growing chorus of discontent from the organization's biggest contributors, Unesco after 1985 will not be like Unesco before 1985. It is hard to imagine any change that will not be salutary, both for the organization and for the very real problems of communication development that the Third World still faces.

At this turning point, it is useful to look back to see what the Unesco NWIO debate has produced and where the debate is likely to lead in the remaining years of the decade. Let us consider, in turn, the U.S. withdrawal from Unesco, the current direction of the debate, and the response to the NWIO debate by the American government and private media.

Withdrawal from Unesco

To judge by reaction from academics, the U.S. withdrawal was at the very least short sighted and at worst a characteristic response from an administration dedicated to use of the big stick (World Forum 1984). What they do not acknowledge is the apparently widespread encouragement the United States mission has received from within the organization itself and from a broad spectrum of governments outside. Nor does most of the criticism address the issues that caused the pullout.

Three reasons can be cited for the U.S. decision. One does not justify withdrawal, but the other two probably do. The first reason was the New World

Information Order, a mushy idea never defined that would, in its extreme version, justify the mobilization of Third World media for political purposes under the banner of national development and make all governments accountable for the media operating under flags. Despite the hours of debate and volumes of statements at Unesco, the Western notion that journalists ought to be independent of government and free to exercise professional judgment burns brightly in the Third World. The Western caucus played its cards poorly in the decade of the NWIO debate, but in the end the power of its strong suit — the appeal of Western ideals, the attractions of Western information technology, the promise of development assistance — triumphed over the vagaries of a new global order. The U.S. withdrawal poured water on a dying fire.

A more important issue that was often obscured behind the rhetoric of the NWIO debate, however, raised serious questions about the value of continued participation in the organization. The issue was the simple competence and honesty of the organization. What on earth does Unesco do? The answer was: not very much, and much of that badly. I know of no one whose dealings with Unesco have not been frustrating. A couple of personal anecdotes are typical.

ITEM: The report of the 29-nation foreign news study organized by the International Association for Mass Communication Research (IAMCR) at Unesco's request was submitted at the end of 1980 (Srebeny-Mohammadi 1980; The "World of News Study" 1984). As of mid-1985, the report was still not published, and there is no hint that it will be. We were criticized — not by Unesco — for publishing our substantial contribution to the project prematurely rather than waiting for publication of the full study. We continued to publish as we accumulated data and analyses and have reaped whatever benefit accrued from it. However, many of the other participants, with data on only one country, still

have no recognition for their contribution or return on their investment of money and effort. At Unesco, the most ordinary reports can take years to reach the public, if they ever get published at all. Researchers who contribute to Unesco's efforts deserve better.

ITEM: In 1983, Richard Cole, dean of the UNC School of Journalism, and I were invited to write an essay on "An American View of the NWIO" for **Cultures**, a slick, high-brow journal published by Unesco in several languages. We did and received a generous honorarium. Our library has not received a copy of the publication for nearly two years; we have not heard a word from the editor since the manuscript was submitted and assume **Cultures** is dead. We don't know, of course, but we cashed the check.

ITEM: In 1981, I was invited to participate in a conference on the use of mass media to promote education for peace sponsored by Unesco and the International Institute of Peace, an organization later described as a front organization for the Soviet Union. For four days, about 20 of us enjoyed the luxury of a spa hotel near Vienna. The formal sessions repeated the rhetoric of the Unesco debate; between sessions, the large Soviet and East German delegations disappeared while the rest of us got acquainted and explored the town where Mozart's wife went for her cure. At the end, we all wrote down suggestions for the use of mass media to promote peace and disarmament. The IIP's obscure journal published the papers that were physically available at the conference; the suggestions, to my knowledge, were never compiled.

ITEM: In 1982, at Unesco headquarters in Paris, I was directed to a basement office of an assistant director of libraries to place an order for several microfiched studies. The names of the man I was to see and that of his assistant were Slavic. The suite of offices was locked and dark; after hearing

me rattle the door, a secretary across the hall in a different office directed me to another department with the casual comment, "Oh, they're never here." I have wondered since whether the men I was supposed to order the microfiche from were among those expelled later for espionage. Whatever their real purpose at Unesco, they apparently had no time for the Unesco library.

The problem is more than one of ordinary inefficiency of a cumbersome bureaucracy. The Government Accounting Office's dry, fact-filled report catalogs some of the problems (Improvements Needed... 1984): Unesco can't define the purpose of many of its programs, can't tell whether they are reaching their goals — in some cases, can't even tell when they start or stop — and doesn't know what they cost. The report cited expenditures for programs whose only goals were "...inculcating communication workers and users alike with a more active and critical attitude to communication and the message it conveys" or "...laying down basic principles that will govern the relatioship between future generations and their environment and habitat." The budget seems to be organized so as to obscure precisely what it should clarify: where the money goes and what comes from it. In most cases, checks are given to governments or organizations, which then certify they spend the money as they were supposed to. Nothing else. The Austrian conference presumably fell into this category. It was not atypical.

Between 1981 and 1983, Unesco awarded nearly 3,000 training fellowships and study grants plus an unknown number of similar awards made through the program divisions. How many other awards, to whom and for what purpose? Unesco couldn't say. Even the regular fellowship program was difficult to evaluate because most recipients failed to file a report at the conclusion of their grant. No one knows what they did with their money or if they did what

they were paid to do.

Internally, the situation is worse. Rosemary Righter, a tough British journalist with no sympathy for Unesco but detailed knowledge of it, describes the U.S. withdrawal as highlighting the warts on Director General Amadou Mahtar M'Bow's face: paranoia, vanity, cupidity and intolerance (Righter 1984). More and more, the organization has become a private fiefdom for a vain, eccentric man dedicated to his own aggrandizement. In recent years, more than 20 top officials resigned, mostly recently [April, 1985] Gerard Bolla, an assistant director general, who quit several months before his scheduled retirement over the failure of M'Bow's promised reforms.

A Mexican official left earlier, denouncing "bureacuratic terrorism which has led to total intellectual suffocation." A Swiss official decried "a climate of suspicion, prejudice, intolerance, incoherence, arbitrariness, fear and servility." A staff survey in 1983 found fewer than four percent thought hiring was based on competence, only 2.5 percent believed promotions were based on efficiency.

Even Unesco's friends are getting impatient. France promised a special contribution of $2 million to help make up for the loss of American funds but apparently has reconsidered (France Breaks Public Silence... 1985) and has joined a half dozen other Western nations (Queue for the Exit 1984) in demanding serious reform. So far little has been forthcoming.

Despite public protestations about the U.S. withdrawal, private reaction is often different. Righter quotes a Third World diplomat: "In no other part of the U.N. system could a director-general get away with a tenth of what M'Bow has done. And your governments say so little, we conclude it happens with your connivance." Could the pullout have been avoided? Probably, if the United

States and its Western and Third World allies had paid more attention to the organization and demanded open, honest administration of reasonable programs ten years ago. But by the 1980s, however, the problems were so ingrained and M'Bow and his tight circle of advisers so caught in their own rhetoric that nothing short of withdrawal could get their attention. Righter reports that M'Bow did not believe the United States would follow through on its withdrawal threat and went into a state of shock for three days when it was announced.

A third reason for withdrawal is the nature of the organization itself. Even beyond the issue of the new global information and economic orders it has debated but not defined, even beyond its fondness for collective rights of nations and cultural imperialism as an all-purpose explanation of Third World problems, even beyond the reports that don't get published and the foolish conferences, there is the basic question of what Unesco accomplishes. The problem is not a consistent tilt toward anti-Western ideology — if we don't want to defend our traditions and accomplishments, we deserve to lose the global debate by default to those who are prepared to condemn them — as much as Unesco's emphasis on vague projects that accomplish nothing. It is true that Unesco is not a development agency, such as the UNDP or USIAID, and it is true that worthwhile projects such as the Fulbright program can be dedicated to talk rather than action. But what is it that Unesco programs accomplish?

Do people learn to read from Unesco? Is the exchange of scientific information improved? Is culture protected? Has the declaration on mass media had any effect in any country? Can anyone define the New World Information Order and cite evidence that its provisions are being practiced anywhere for good or evil? The answer to the first three questions is a very qualified yes, but they represent an inefficient approach to real problems; the answer to the

last two must be no. The argument that Unesco accomplishes so little good with such a poor return on investment and is so often sidetracked that the question must be raised whether membership is worth the trouble. It is a good question to which the reasonable answer is probably "no."

Some of the silent supporters of the U.S. position argue that the United States could exert more influence as a member than it can now as an outsider. The argument brings to mind Lyndon Johnson's answer to the question of demanding the resignation of J. Edgar Hoover, then clearly incapable of running the F.B.I. In its sanitized version, Johnson is supposed to have said he'd rather have Hoover inside the tent looking out than outside looking in. How about Unesco?

Since requests for financial moderation and program reform fell on deaf ears for several years, it seems reasonable that only something as drastic as withdrawal could get M'Bow's attention. And the United States is now in the envious position of not trying to negotiate a laundry list of reforms while being accused of imposing its will against the majority of member. Instead, it can sit on the sidelines while admonishing the Third World majority: YOU decide what kind of organization YOU want Unesco to be; if we find it compatible with our view, we'll rejoin. The policy provides the moderate Third Nations — probably still a majority — with the opportunity and responsibility to define the purpose of the organization without the catch-all of antiimperialism, anti-Israel, anti-United States rhetoric and programs that have served the vocal and radical minority so well in the past.

Unesco is really no longer a major player in world communication issues. The New World Information Order issue, in the mind of the radicals, was hijacked by the West when it dazzled the Third World with offers of increased

access to information technology. From another perspective, a decade of debate with little to show for it left everyone exhausted, and the NWIO debate burned itself out. In either view, it had accomplished very little. The International Program for Development of Communication was never well funded, and contributions seem to have dried up. The real action is in the West where governments and private media are finally aroused from ignorance of Third World complaints and needs, finally committed to helping to reduce the gap between the information-rich West and information-poor Third World.

The New Interest in Development

The American withdrawal from Unesco came at a time when Western influence on the Third World communication development debate was reasserting itself. The United States, it seemed, had walked away just when it was winning the fight. The analogy is oversimplified but not inaccurate. After a full decade of heated and often tendentious debate over the role of mass media in the developing nations, a consensus emerged that the Western model was not so bad after all. And whatever vision now inspired Third World communications developers, the hardware to lead them to it could come only from the West. The West had not played its hand skillfully but still held the trump cards.

The push for a New World Information Order, which a decade of debate in Unesco had not defined, failed for three reasons. One was the hollowness of the Marxist rhetoric that had shaped the issue in the first place. On first hearing, the sweeping statements about neo-imperialism sounded exhilarating and fresh, but the bits of evidence architects of the new order shuffled and reshuffled under the guise of critical analysis research began to look like a shell game. As the dull traditional quantitative research studies piled up,

challenging one after another of the premises of the New World Information Order, defenders of the neo-imperialism school had to keep changing the questions (The "World of the News" Study 1984; Schramm and Atwood 1981; Stevenson and Shaw 1984; Larson 1984). No, the Western agencies really did not ignore the Third World; they covered it badly. No, there really was no monopoly on information; the Third World was conditioned to use its resources poorly. No, the real problem was something else. Always something else. In the end, the debate was so transparently divorced from the real and serious issues of development that it became an exercise in Orwellian rhetoric even the most fervent advocates of the NWIO grew tired of.

A second and more substantive reason for the failure of the NWIO was the experience of trying to implement it. It was one thing to stand before the Unesco general conference and argue for the mobilization of mass media to support a new global order but quite another to piece together a daily newsfile that was credible enough for domestic consumption and minimally palatable for international exchange. The experiences of the IPDC and the various new national agencies, regional exchanges and global services it supported were salutory. They demonstrated the gap between the rhetoric and the day-to-day problems of deadlines, mechanical failure, payrolls and political interference.

The experiments in information exchange that the NWIO debate fostered did help expand the flow of news in a minor way, mostly within the Third World, but their real value was a sobering influence on Third World journalism. People who have to edit news stories from both Iran and Iraq or prepare copy acceptable to both Libya and Chad soon learn the value of aloof "objectivity" that critics of Western news agencies had equated with hostility and derision. They also learn that mobilization of journalism, even when it is done under the

banner of the Unesco mass media declaration, inevitably redounds to the advantage of the regime in power. Especially then. If anything, the professional values of Western journalism, particularly the independence to challenge the regime in power, emerged from the Unesco debate with greater support in the Third World than they had had a decade or two earlier.

The Non-Aligned News Agencies pool was the most visible example of the NWIO in action, but regional exchanges and specialized services could be found in all parts of the Third World (Mateau 1985; Giffard 1984; Stevenson 1985). None did very much to dent the dominance of the Western news agencies. The failure of the pool was especially important because it had been organized precisely to redefine news and to recast the purpose of journalism. A 1983 study in India (Mathur and Shrivastava 1984) found very little use of pool material in Indian papers even though the Indian government — but not journalists — were enthusiastic supporters. The authors concluded that evidence of the pool's failure was that Western journalists no longer criticized it; now they just ignored it.

Finally, the debate rekindled an interest in the use of communication to promote development — real development, defined as Lerner and Schramm had done in terms of economic and political growth, not the mushy rhetoric of the NWIO. And that new concern led to the discovery of telecommunication. New research demonstrated consistently that investment in telecommunication generated an impressive return in social and economic growth (Pool and Steven 1983; Ghorpade et al. 1984; Stevenson 1985; Saunders et al. 1983; Pierce and Jequier 1983; The Missing Link 1984). And unlike mass media, telecommunication seemed to produce change both at the micro or individual level and at the macro or social level as well. However you looked at it, the best evidence argued in favor of

special attention to telecommunication in any country's development plan.

Communication development in the 1980s and beyond seemed firmly anchored in telecommunication, and that meant incorporation of the Third World more and more into a global communication system still dominated by the West. If anything, the emergence of information as the driving force of Western economies portended a growing Western influence in the Third World, and certainly in the thickening web of global telecommunications.

For those who had argued in favor of disengagment from the West as a prerequisite to "authentic" national development (Hamelink 1983; Schiller 1981, 1984), the prospects for the remainder of the decade — Unesco cut adrift, Third World journalists asserting independence, the Third World itself moving into the shadow of the information age — the outlook was grim. For the Third World, however, the prospect for communication development was hopeful if not without obstacles. And for the West, the collapse of the new world information order debate represented an opportunity to reassert influence in an area of international affairs where it had faltered. But it also meant that Western governments and mass media, by default, also assumed the responsibilities for leadership in tackling problems that had grown more complex and intractable in the two decades since Lerner and Schramm first argued that mass media could speed and ease the ascent toward modernity.

New Interest in Telecommunication

While interest in the United States began to lead finally to hopeful public and private commitments to communication development, the international agencies also recognized the importance of communication to broad-based economic development. Three important studies all focused on

telecommunications, making it the centerpiece of a renewed interest in communication and development for the rest of the 1980s and into the 1990s.

The World Bank's 1983 study, **Telecommunications and Economic Development** (Saunders et al.), was the most cautious of the three, fitting recent research into the three main perspectives on the role of telecommunications and economic growth: (1) telecommunications does not deserve priority in development schemes because it is disruptive and ineffective; (2) demands for telecommunications service should be met and service expanded to rural areas when cost effective; (3) telecommunications deserves priority as a "prime means to achieve a wide range of social and economic goals in numerous socially oriented sectors, including the delivery of education and health services." The authors did not claim that telecommunications was a magic multiplier for the 1980s but did come down strongly in favor of the more optimistic interpretation of telecommunication's potential. At a minimum, it appeared that the study would increase the visibility of telecommunications in the World Bank and probably its commitment to telecommunications projects. That in itself promised to be significant because the bank was the major funding source for Third World telecommunications investment.

A report by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) was less cautious about the importance of telecommunications to economic development (Pierce and Jequier 1983). Case studies examined in the report showed cost/benefit ratios as high as 100 to one in a wide range of economic enterprises. A hypothetical calculation concluded that one simple satellite earth station connected to ten telephones over nine years could contribute from $4,000 to $15,000 to the gross domestic product of a relatively wealthy developing country with a minimal

existing phone system. In a rural area, the return was estimated to be from $167,000 to $496,000. The authors, unlike the cautious researchers who never could satisfactorily sort out cause and effect in Lerner's and Schramm's time, argued that the direction of the arrow linking telecommunications and growth was clear — and, in fact, the opposite of what earlier research had suggested. The secretary general of the ITU, Richard E. Butler, noted the conventional wisdom that telecommunication growth followed economic development and was a luxury that a developing country could afford only after other needs were met. Now it appeared that telecommunication produced imortant benefits across the whole spectrum of development goals and should be at the core of development programs, not at the periphery. This was clearly a different way of thinking about development than the emphasis on one-way, vertical mass media of Lerner and Schramm days.

The third report added another voice to the growing chorus favoring investment in telecommunications as a key to Third World development. This one was another internatonal commission, headed by British diplomat Sir Donald Maitland, organized by the ITU (The Missing Link... 1984). In the spirit of hard-headed realism of the 1980s, the commission recognized the importance of shifting available resources to telecommunication — such as a small tax on international calls to finance Third World development — rather than massive new investment programs. The goal, it said, should be to make basic telecommunications service available to everyone on earth by the early 21st century. An impossible dream? Perhaps, but no more visionary than the goal of providing five radio receivers per 100 people that Unesco had set a generation earlier, a goal that had been met and then surpassed unnoticed in the early 1980s.

Both the ITU/OECD and Maitland Commission reports offered the outlines of specifc but expensive ideas for implementing their conclusions. The former argued in favor a GLOBDOM (for "global" and "domestic") system, comprising four satellites with global coverage linking a network of ground stations. Total cost: $1.26 billion. But a payoff of "telephone service to all the rural regions of the developing world, even the most remote, for an initial investment cost which is practically similar to that of the telephone service in the industrialized countries."

The Maitland Commission recommended the establishment of a global center for telecommunications development. Its major task would be to come up with $12 billion a year for investment needed to reach the ambitious goal the report called for. The figure seemed less dreamlike, however, when one remembered that the developing nations already invested $8 billion in telecommunications in 1983. The 50% increase was an ambitious goal but, given the climate of the 1980s, not impossible.

Even if all of the new institutions succeeded in their ambitious plans, there was no guarantee that communication with telecommunication rather than mass mdia at the core would be any more successful than the overly ambitious programs of the 1960s. Certainly the Third World's climb toward modernity in the 1980s and '90s could be no less difficult or free from turmoil than it had been in the preceding decades, but the issues were important enough that no one concerned with the fate of the Third World could afford to ignore them.

The U.S. government had made plenty of promises during the NWIO debates to increase its support of communication development. Could the new global interest in telecommunication point the direction toward a new government aid program? The United States, of course, had promised that the money saved by

the withdrawal from Unesco would be used for compatible bilateral programs. At first, the prospect looked favorable that additional money would be available for something like a new emphasis on telecommunication aid. But in the squeeze of $200 billion deficits, there was little hope that the $48 or so that had been spent on Unesco would escape the budget cutters' knife.

However, there was hope that the new attention given to communication development in general and to telecommunication in particular in existing organizations such as the World Bank, USAID and maybe even UNDP could redirect existing funds toward telecommunication assistance. Even a moderate shift of existing programs could move the Third World significantly toward active participation in the information age.

Private mass media, mostly newspaper organizations, lacked the vision of a future filled with science fiction technology, but they were further ahead in building the foundations of a permanent program of aid, training and encouragement.

The American Response

Communication development also stayed on the public agenda in the United States even after the decision to leave Unesco was announced. In fact, the brave talk about increasing development assistance that had been made at the height of the Unesco debate prompted study groups, test projects and reports that collectively had a significant impact on the two interest groups most concerned with development, the federal government and the media themselves.

A survey of 25 federal agencies in late 1984 found that few bureaucracies knew exactly what they were doing in the field of international communications, but four agencies — Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private Investment Corp.,

Agency for International Development and the U.S. Information Agency — were investing $680 million a year in communication development (Communication Development... 1984). At a minimum in 1983-84, according to the government-funded study, communication development activities included at least 63 separate training and assistance programs that involved more than 1,100 Third World participants in more than 100 countries at a cost of some $422 million. The report, not surprisingly, found lack of coordination and even common purpose in most of the federal government's activities, but, on the bright side, also found a new interest in the area.

The new interest extended right to the top of the unwieldy bureaucracy where the White House and National Security Council staff in March, 1984, ordered an interagency committee on information and communications policy to review the issue and come up with recommendations. The report went to the White House in November. The report, as the **Chronicle of International Communication** put it (U.S. Development... 1984), forced "the Administration to make a conscious, high level, relatively public decision on whether it can afford to continue U.S. drift and dribble responses to Third World media and telecommunications problems." From the early days of the Kennedy Administration when the idea of using communication to promote economic growth took root to the disillusioned 1980s, this was the first time that the issue of what the United States expected to accomplish with communication development assistance and why it should try to do it reached, as they say, the highest levels of government. In a city where power is measued by distance from the presidential Oval Office, communication development had become an important issue for the first time.

The report (U.S. Development Communications... 1985) framed the issue in

the rhetoric of the Reagan Administration — support for the free-flow ideology, strengthening of U.S. competitiveness, support for general American development objectives — and recommended both better use of existing activities and an increase in the total amount of money allocated to communication development. In an administration sacrificing all manner of domestic sacred cows to an uncontrollable debt, any talk of increasing something as friendless as foreign aid was remarkable.

The prospect of a new awareness of the importance of communication development combined with the commitment of existing and new funds to the field meant that the United States government might be able to play its very strong cards in the 1980s and '90s more skillfully than it had in the 1960s and '70s. And by the mid-1980s, it had better support from the private media, which were important allies in countering the still-prevalent argument that Third World development required the egregious brand of journalism still bravely practiced by the Non-Aligned News Agencies pool and many government-run news organs.

For a second conference in Talloires in 1983, the World Press Freedom Committee and the Associated Press put together a list of 300 exchange, training and internship programs in 70 countries. No one knew so much was going on. Two new programs sponsored by the American Society of Newspaper Editors and the Alfred E. Friendly Foundation providing 22 internships/-fellowships were announced. The WPFC itself increased the number of grants it had made to a total of more than 70 since the organization began supporting Third World media in 1977. In early 1985, a permanent Foreign Journalists Center near Washington was announced. At its beginning, the center was little more than an office in a Washington suburb, but it held the promise of doing something the IPDC had chosen not to do — become a clearing house for all of

the needs and resources in communication development while sustaining a critical mass of Western private media commitment to parallel that of the U.S. government.

The center is located at the headquarters of the American Press Institute in Reston VA, down the street from the Newspaper Center, which houses the American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA), American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) and World Press Freedom Committee (WPFC). Organizers expect many of the 1,200 to 1,500 foreign journalists visiting the United States to participate in various group workshops or to take advantage of facilities for individual research and training. Among other things, the two facilities contain a wealth of information and expertise on newspaper technology, which is of special interest to many visitors.

The Foreign Journalists Center was also intended to serve as a clearinghouse for a wide range of orientation and training programs already underway. A British report tallied the major professionally oriented programs (Hands-on Training... 1985). Major industry- and foundation-funded programs (as distinct from programs funded by USIA or USAID) included these:

— World Press Institute, St. Paul. Provides foreign (mostly Third World) journalists with six week on campus followed by five months of internship, travel and research. Funded by various industries.

— Alfred Friendly Press Fellowships. Awarded to 10-12 Third World journalists, one month orientation and five months internship with U.S. paper. Administered by the Institute of International Education.

— ASNE Journalism Exchange. Work-study program for 12 Third World journalists, six weeks, half orientation and travel, half as newspaper interns. Administered by Fletcher School for Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; media

funded.

— Working Journalists Project. Three-week work travel program for foreign journalists, administered by Academy for Educational Development, funded by USIA.

— Nieman Fellowship. Nine-month study program at Harvard, includes 5-8 foreign journalists; administered by Harvard; funded by foundation.

— Professional Journalists Fellowships. Nine-month program at Stanford for 10-12 journalists, including two Reuters fellows; independent study with some focus on journalism.

— Newhouse Broadcast Seminar. Eight-week study and observation program at Syracuse University for 16 broadcast journalists, mostly from Third World; administered by Newhouse School of Public Communication.

— U.S. Telecommunications Training Institute. Courses and seminars for broadcasters; administered by Academy for Educational Development; industry funded.

— Inter American Press Association program. Scholarships and work-study for Latin American journalists; administered by IAPA.

— Partners of the Americas. One-month educational exchange for ten Latin American and ten U.S. journalists; mostly orientation and visits; administered by Partners of the Americas.

— African Leaders Program. One- to three-month internships with U.S. media; administered by Operations Crossroads Africa.

— Africa Travel Program. Two- to six-week visits for African journalists; administered by African American Institute.

— World Press Freedom Committee. Periodic workshops and seminars, mostly abroad, for foreign journalists; administered by WPFC.

— Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships. Three-month travel and observation grants for potential leaders, including journalists; administered by the Eisenhower Fellowship in Philadelphia.

Beyond the specific training programs, there was some evidence of commitment to long-term development assistance. The most promising effort was a demonstration project by the International Press Telecommunications Council, an organization of Western news agencies, to show how existing satellite technology could be used by Third World news agencies and media to stitch together just about any kind of regional or global news distribution system they want. The heart of the project was an end-run around government PTTs by installing small satellite receiving dishes like those used by virtually all American papers in a number of countries to show how national agencies could receive information directly from satellites. Major participants included the German press agency, DPA, and Intelsat.

With access to Western hardware (becoming cheaper) and the existing global telecommunications system (already inexpensive), the Third World in the 1980s and '90s has the capability to put together just about any kind of news and information system it wants. With that capability — and financial and moral encouragement from the West — the coming decade will be an exciting challenge to those concerned with extending the benefits of the information age to the developing nations.

The fruits of the information age — computers, satellites, printing technology and everything else that is blurring the old distinctions among media as quickly as it is creating new media — will spill over into the Third World in the 1980s and 1990s despite anyone's efforts to prevent it or to promote it. It is unlikely that this spillover will speed economic and

political development in the way that architects of the old paradigm hoped or that it will help shape the vision of Third World cultural independence that advocates of the new paradigm propose.

Instead, communication has the potential to contribute constructively if modestly to Third World development, and those in the West with the responsibility and authority to shape policy can influence constructively if modestly the size and direction of the contribution. With patience, tolerance and understanding on both sides, the gap in understanding between the West and the Third World can be breached and the gap in wealth narrowed. Without them, the information age will breed more of the chaos and violence that have so far accompanied the Third World's terrible ascent to an uncertain future.

References

Communications Development; a Preliminary Review of U.S. Government Communications Activites for Developing Countries. 1984. Washington DC: Academy for Educational Development.

France Breaks Public Silence, Criticizes Management and Policies of UNESCO. 1985. **The Chronicle of Higher Education**, April 25, p. 35.

Ghorpade, Shailendra, et al. 1984. A Re-evaluation of the Dominant Paradigm of Communication and Development. Paper presented to the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, meeting in Gainsville FL.

Gifford, C. Anthony. 1984. Inter Press Service: News from the Third World. **Journal of Communication** 34(4):41-59.

Hamelink, Cees. 1983. **Cultural Autonomy in Global Communications.** New York: Longman.

Hands-on Training with No Strings. 1985. **The Media Reporter**, Spring, pp. 14-16.

Improvements Needed in UNESCO's Management, Personnel, Financial, and Budgeting Practices. 1984. Washington DC: General Accounting Office.

Laarson, James F. 1984. **Television's Window on the World: International Affairs Coverage on the U.S. Networks.** Norwood NJ: Ablex.

Mateu, Pablo E. 1985. Latin America's New Media. Paper Presented to the International Communication Association, meeting in Honolulu HI.

Mathur, Pradeep, and Shrivastava, K. M. 19984. **Non-Aligned Movement; New Delhi and Beyond.** New Delhi: Sterling Publishers.

The Missing Link [Maitland Commission Report]. 1984. Geneva: International Telecommunications Union.

Pierce, William, and Nicolas Jequier. 1983. **Telecommunications for Development.** Geneva: International Telecommunications Union.

Pool, Ithiel de Sola, and Peter M. Steven. 1983. Appropriate Telecommunications for Rural Development. In Indu B. Singh, ed., **Telecommunications in the Year 2000,** Norwood NJ: Ablex.

Queue for the Exit. 1984. **The Economist**, February 25, p. 34.

Righter, Rosemary. 1984. Inside the Court of "Dictator" M'Bow. **The Sunday Times** (London), January 8, p. 17.

Saunders, Robert J., et al. 1983. **Telecommunications and Economic Development.** Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Schiller, Herbert I. 1981. **Who Knows: Information in the Age of the Fortune 500.** Norwood NJ: Ablex.

Schiller, Herbert I. 1984. **Information and the Crisis Economy.** Norwood NJ: Ablex.

Schramm, Wilbur, and L. Ervin Atwood. 1981. **Circulation of News in the Third World: a Study of Asia.** Hong Kong: Chinese University Press of Hong Kong.

Sreberny-Mohammadi, Annabelle. 1980. **The World of the News; the News of the World.** Report submitted to Unesco.

Stevenson, Robert L. 1985. New News for the New World Information Order. Paper presented to the International Communication Association, meeting in Honolulu HI.

Stevenson, Robert L. 1985. Third World Communication Development in the 1970s. Paper presented to the International Communication Association, meeting in Honolulu HI.

Stevenson, Robert L., and Donald Lewis Shaw. 1984. **Foreign News and the New World Information Order.** Ames IA: Iowa State University Press.

U.S. Development Communications Assistance Programs. 1984. **Chronicle of International Communication** 5(9):1 (November).

U.S. Development Communications Assistance Programs. 1985. Report prepared for the National Security Council by the Senior Inter-Agency Group for International Communication and Information Policy.

The "World of the News" Study. 1984. **Journal of Communication** 34(1):120-142.

World Forum: the U.S. Decision to Withdraw from UNESCO. 1984. **Journal of Communication** 34(4):81-179.